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“I LIKE YOU WHEN YOU ARE
SILENT” : THE FUTURE OF NDAS
AND MANDATORY ARBITRATION
IN THE ERA OF #METOO
1

Jonathan Ence *

I. INTRODUCTION
On October 5, 2017, the New York Times published an exposé of Harvey
Weinstein, an influential film producer, which sparked what came to be known as
the #METOO movement. 2 As part of the report, Ashley Judd and numerous other
actresses outed Weinstein for using his position of power to rape, sexually assault,
and sexually abuse them–accusations that spanned over thirty years. 3 Inspired by
the courage of these women, countless others came forward to share their stories of
sexual assault by individuals in positions of power. 4 Survivors of sexual assault
appeared to garner strength against their attackers as men in power had to account
for their transgressions, often leading to job loss or criminal charges. 5 While dozens of Weinstein employees knew about his conduct, only a handful ever confronted
him, and Judd was the first to go public. 6
Despite opening the floodgates to speak out about sexual assault, a significant
number of survivors have been unable to share their stories because of non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), sometimes referred to as confidentiality agreements
(CAs). 7 In the situation of Mckayla Maroney, 2012 Gold Medal Olympian, USA
Gymnastics forced her to sign a confidentiality agreement after settling over abuse

1. PABLO NERUDA, I Like You When You are Silent, in TWENTY LOVE POEMS AND A SONG OF
DESPAIR (W.S. Merwin trans., 1993) (1924).
* B.A., Brigham Young University 2014, J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law
2020. I would like to thank the editorial staff and members of the Journal of Dispute Resolution for their
diligent efforts in improving this publication, as well as Dean Rafael Gely for his advice and guidance.
2. Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html.
3. Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s Accusers Tell
Their Stories, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/fromaggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories.
4. See Stephanie Zacharek, Eliana Dockterman & Haley Sweetland Edwards, TIME Person of the
Year 2017: The Silence Breakers, TIME, http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-silence-breakers/
(last visited Mar. 24, 2019); see also News About #MeToo on Twitter, TWITTER, https://twitter.
com/search?q=#metoo&src=typd&lang=en (last visited Sept. 6, 2018).
5. See Christen A. Johnson & KT Hawbaker, #MeToo: A Timeline of Events, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 7,
2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html.
6. Kantor & Twohey, supra note 2.
7. Sara Ganim & Sunlen Serfaty, Why Some Victims of Sexual Harassment Can’t Speak Out, CNN
POL., https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/24/politics/non-disclosure-agreements-sexual-harassment (last updated Nov. 24, 2017).
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by team doctor Larry Nassar. 8 The provision would have prevented Maroney from
testifying against her attacker at the expense of a $100,000 fine. 9 Only after receiving a cornucopia of societal pressure did USAG decline to enforce the penalty
against Maroney. 10 While USAG claimed Maroney was the only victim that they
forced to sign a non-disclosure agreement, 11 NDAs have silenced countless other
women. 12
Likewise, the Weinstein cases involved not only quieting the survivors, but also
all employees of the Weinstein Corporation. 13 It became blatantly clear that NDAs
had not only restricted survivors from sharing their story cathartically, but that they
had also given abusive men a path to legally harass women while simultaneously
holding onto positions of power. 14 Notably, the power of employers to enforce
these provisions against women is largely dependent on the public’s ability to chastise the employer, making it easier for low-profile cases involving smaller employers to continue in the dark. 15
In response to the public outcry over CAs and, multiple states have pursued
legislation to limit the abilities of employers to use NDAs in sexual harassment
cases. 16 In six states that legislation became law. 17 At the end of September, two
California bills went before Governor Jerry Brown to either receive a veto or signature. 18 Furthermore, as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Congress
passed a section that prohibits tax deductions for settlements involving NDAs and
sexual harassment. 19

8. Victor Mather, McKayla Maroney Says USA Gymnastics Forced Confidentiality in Sexual Abuse
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/sports/olympics/mckayla-maroney-usa-gymnastics-confidentiality-agreement.html.
9. Id.
10. Heather Tucker, USA Gymnastics Says it Will Not Fine McKayla Maroney if She Speaks Out
Against Larry Nassar, USA TODAY (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/2018/01/16/usa-gymnastics-mckayla-maroney-larry-nassar/1039025001/.
11. USA Gymnastics: There Are No Other Non-Disclosure Agreements, ABC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/usa-gymnastics-disclosure-agreements/story?id=530644633.
12. Kantor & Twohey, supra note 2.
13. Caitlin Gibson, How NDAs Kept the Lid on Harassment Scandals - And Why That Might be
Changing, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/how-ndaskept-the-lid-on-harassment-scandals--and-why-that-might-be-changing/2017/10/25/62af1e30-b99d11e7-a908-a3470754bbb9_story.html?utm_term=.5ff5e4b64713.
14. Ganim & Serfaty, supra note 7.
15. Id.
16. Michelle R. Smith, Some States Place Limits on Secret Harassment Settlements, AP NEWS (Aug.
27, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/448968e898554d128c3247e41f7d8d91.
17. Id.
18. See California May Soon Join States Placing Limits on Secret Harassment Settlements, CBS S.F.
BAY AREA (Aug. 27, 2018), https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2018/08/27/california-may-soon-joinstates-placing-limits-on-secret-harassment-settlements/; see also Laurel Rosenhall, Jerry Brown Paddles Left, Paddles Right on #MeToo Laws, CALMATTERS (Oct. 2, 2018), https://calmatters.org/articles/jerry-brown-paddles-left-right-on-metoo-laws/.
19. Tax Cuts & Jobs Act § 13307, PUB. LAW 115-97 (prohibits a tax deduction for trade or business
expenses paid or incurred for: (1) any settlement or payment related to sexual harassment or sexual abuse
if such settlement or payment is subject to a nondisclosure agreement, or (2) attorney’s fees related to
such a settlement or payment).
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This Comment will discuss the effect of these bills and whether serious change
is afoot. In the age of #METOO, many oppose the use of NDAs in sexual harassment settlements as a means of silencing survivors. 20 However, the Supreme Court
has interpreted Title VII investigations to trump CAs, which would give the appearance that survivors have had the ability to file claims against their employers and
testify against them in criminal trials. 21 This Comment will also examine the responses of several state legislative bodies and Congress in their reactions to the
#METOO movement.

II. OVERVIEW OF NON-DISCLOSURE AND ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS
Laws in the United States do not distinguish between CAs and NDAs and will
often define a non-disclosure agreement as a particular type of confidentiality agreement. 22 For purposes of this paper, the term “NDA” will be used to refer to both
confidentiality agreements and non-disclosure agreements.

A. Non-disclosure Agreements
NDAs are a key component of most settlements resolving a legal dispute. 23 In
cases of sexual harassment in the workplace, NDAs prohibit the victim from disclosing details about the settlement or facts which led to the settlement. 24 A majority of courts allow for an employee to testify in a civil trial despite the implementation of an NDA, however, some states have barred such testimony. 25
However, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, even after signing NDA the
victim may still file charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) or assist them with an investigation. 26 “[A] promise is unenforceable if the
interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
harmed by enforcement of the agreement.” 27 In EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., Inc., 94 F.3d
738 (1st Cir. App. 1996), the First Circuit weighed “the impact of settlement provisions that effectively bar cooperation with the EEOC…against the impact that outlawing such provisions would have on private dispute resolution.” 28 Applying this
test, the appellate court found that confidentiality agreements prohibiting survivors
20. Jessica Levinson, Non-Disclosure Agreements Can Enable Abusers. Should We Get Rid of NDAs
for Sexual Harassment?, NBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/non-disclosure-agreements-can-enable-abusers-should-we-get-rid-ncna840371.
21. EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir. App. 1996) (citing Town of Newton v.
Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).
22. H.B. 2020, 53rd Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2018) (“‘Nondisclosure agreement’ means a confidentiality agreement or contract provision that prohibits the disclosure of information by a party to the
contract”).
23. Hiba Hafiz, How Legal Agreements Can Silence Victims of Workplace Sexual Assault, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/legal-agreements-sexual-assault-ndas/543252/.
24. Id.
25. Jodi L. Short, Killing the Messenger: The Use of Nondisclosure Agreements to Silence Whistleblowers, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1207, 1212 (1999).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
27. EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Town of Newton v. Rumery,
480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).
28. Id.
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from reporting to the EEOC would thwart Congress’s intent in enacting Title VII. 29
Furthermore, there exists a public interest in preventing employment discrimination, sexual harassment claims, and permitting survivors to speak with the EEOC
vindicates that interest. 30 Subsequently, the EEOC filed a notice that employers
“may not interfere with the protected right of an employee to file a charge, testify,
assist, or participate…” in an investigation or hearing under Title VII. 31
However, if it were easy to file a claim under Title VII then supposedly everybody would do it, but the bar for proving sexual harassment under Title VII is extremely high, employer defenses are too strong, and the workplace ecosystem combines to deter this sort of action. 32 To establish actionable sexual harassment under
Title VII, a plaintiff-employee must show that (1) the employee experienced “harassing conduct” based on sex that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an
abusive environment or alter the conditions of employment; (2) the conduct was
objectively offensive to a reasonable employee under the circumstances; and (3) the
conduct was subjectively offensive. 33 Moreover, the employee may only bring a
complaint against the employer, but not against the individual harasser. 34
The Supreme Court has, more or less, adhered to two categories of sexual harassment that are actionable under Title VII: quid pro quo and hostile work environment. 35 Under a quid pro quo action the plaintiff-employee must demonstrate that
there was a “tangible employment action,” 36 which is manifest in “a significant
change in employment status, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.” 37 If the employee proves that an action occurred, the Court has determined
that such occurrence helps determine that the agency aided in committing a tort and
creates vicarious liability. 38 If the employee is unable to prove a tangible employment action then the employer may raise the Faragher defense. 39 “The defense
comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care
to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” 40 In
other words, if an employer takes reasonable measures to prevent sexual harassment
29. Id. at 743.
30. Id. at 744.
31. General Statement, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Apr. 10, 1997),
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/waiver.html.
32. See e.g., Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming
System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 915 (2008); Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability
for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 700-06 (2000).
33. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991). See e.g., Fantini v. Salem St. C., 557 F.3d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 2009);
Powell v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 445 F.3d 1074, 1079 (8th Cir. 2006); Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc.,
159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077-78
(3d Cir. 1996).
35. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753-54 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
36. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 744.
37. Id. The 6th Circuit has held that a downgraded job evaluation, from “excellent” to “very good,”
does not constitute a “tangible employment action.” Morris v. Oldham Cty. Fiscal Ct., 201 F.3d 784,
789 (6th Cir. 2000). See also Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 932 n.8 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A tangible employment action has to cause a substantial detriment to the plaintiff’s employment relationship.”).
38. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 745.
39. See Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
40. Id.
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(training, anti-discrimination policies, avenues for reporting, etc.) and the employee
fails to use these then the employer may exit unscathed. 41
On its face, the second prong–that the employee takes advantage of the opportunities–appears reasonable. Nevertheless, this recourse is typically a last-ditch effort for women, who will often only complain through the respective channels when
other responses, such as ignoring the harassment, have failed. 42
Virginia Schein explained that women face multiple risks when reporting
claims to the EEOC. 43 First, sexual harassment tends to occur in workplaces with
designed power-related systemic qualities. 44 In other words, women will often tolerate sexual harassment rather than report it to preserve their career and professional
support network. 45 Second, when women decide to report the harassment their
coworkers tend to cut them off. 46 This may lead to poor job performance, which
becomes a pretext for termination. 47 Moreover, the plaintiff may only file a Title
VII complaint within 180 days of the incident. 48 If the survivor manages to file her
claim in time, she might be rejected anyway by the EEOC, which rejects most the
the claims it receives. 49

B. Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
Often, NDAs will accompany a mandatory arbitration agreement. 50 These are
agreements in which an employee agrees not to sue an employer, but to bring any
claims in confidential arbitration. 51 Generally, arbitration can be a more favorable
alternative to resolving a dispute than taking a cause of action through the court
system. 52 However, arbitration in the workplace receives noted criticism because
the agreements are often hidden within the employment contract and employers
41. Vance v. Ball St. Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 429 (2013) (finding that this defense may “mitigate or avoid
liability” for an employer); Grossman, supra note 32, at 708-10 (arguing that the defense is properly
applied to mitigate damages and to avoid liability only in limited circumstances, but noting that numerous courts have used Faragher-Ellerth to grant summary judgment for the employer).
42. James E. Gruber, How Women Handle Sexual Harassment: A Literature Review, 74 Soc. & Soc.
Res. 3, 4 (1989).
43. Virginia E. Schein, Power, Sex and Systems, 9 WOMEN MGMT. REV. 4, 5 (1994).
44. Id.
45. Id. (“The reward, referral and resource-sharing nature of the system pressures a woman towards
tolerance rather than telling.”). See also Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn’t She Just Report Him?
The Psychological and Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC.
ISSUES 117, 122 (1995) (“They believe that nothing can or will be done, and many are reluctant to cause
problems for the harasser. The most common reason, however, is fear – fear of retaliation, of not being
believed, or hurting one’s career, or of being shamed and humiliated.”).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Time Limits for Filing a Charge, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/timeliness.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2019).
49. Alieza Durana, The Sexual-Harassment Victims Who Can’t Get to Court, ATLANTIC (Oct. 8,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/year-metoo-not-everyones-protected-sexualharassment/572329/.
50. Kevin J. Hamilton & Harry H. Schneider Jr., Confidential Arbitration Agreements for High-Profile Clients and Senior Executives, 43 LITIG. 1 (2016).
51. See David Seligman, The Model State Consumer & Employee Justice Enforcement Act, NAT’L
CONSUMER L. CTR. 59 (2016), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/arbitration/model-state-arb-act2015.pdf.
52. Barbara Kate Repa, Arbitration Pros and Cons, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/arbitration-pros-cons-29807.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2018).
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typically force employees to agree to such provisions. 53 Employment cases that end
up in arbitration also have a much lower success rate than employment litigation
trials. 54
Additionally, arbitration prevents these cases from entering the public realm of
knowledge, shrouding the process in secrecy. 55 Nevertheless, the National Labor
Relations Act makes it unlawful to prevent employees from engaging in a concerted
activity. 56 Before Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925,
courts routinely refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate. 57 The FAA directs
courts to “respect and enforce” arbitration provisions that parties agree to, thus creating a conflict between the FAA and National Labor Relations Act. 58 The Supreme
Court of the United States recently decided this controversy in Epic Systems Corp.
v. Lewis, which this article will address below in Phase III.

III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO METOO MOVEMENT
Because of the #METOO movement, state and federal legislatures have sought
to prevent future prohibitions on survivors from disclosing their experiences with
sexual harassment in the workplace. The National Conference of State Legislatures
has reported a startling amount of legislation addressing sexual harassment. 59 This
phase of the article will address the proposed and enacted legislation to combat
sexual harassment.

A.

Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017

To deter employers from entering into nondisclosure agreements with plaintiffemployees, or to simply remove an existing tax benefit, Congress added a provision
in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. 60 The provision provides that “[n]o deduction
53. Seligman, supra note 51, at 59 (“Although Congress’s purpose in enacting the FAA was to allow
companies, bargaining at arms-length, to settle on an alternative dispute resolution forum, a series of
recent Supreme Court decisions has expanded the Act’s reach to cover almost all employment and consumer contracts, whether or not the parties actually bargained over the term.”); see also David Horton
& Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Employment Arbitration After the Revolution, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 457,
457-58 (2016).
54. See e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes
and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2011).
55. Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AM. ARB. ASS’N 23 (Nov. 1, 2009),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Employment%20Rules.pdf (“The arbitrator shall maintain the
confidentiality of the arbitration and shall have the authority to make appropriate rulings to safeguard
that confidentiality, unless the parties agree otherwise or the law provides to the contrary.”); JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures, JAMS (July 1, 2014), https://www.jamsadr.com/rules-employment-arbitration/english#twenty-six (The arbitrator “shall maintain the confidential nature of the
Arbitration proceeding and the Award, including the Hearing, except as necessary in connection with a
judicial challenge to or enforcement of an Award, or unless otherwise required by law or judicial decision.”).
56. Interfering with Employee Rights (Section 7 & 8(a)(1)), NAT’L LAB. REL. BD.,
https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/employers/interfering-employee-rights-section-78a1(last visited Mar. 25, 2019).
57. Scherk v. Alberto–Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974).
58. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (West 1947).
59. 2018 Legislation on Sexual Harassment in the Legislature, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb.
11, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/2018-legislative-sexual-harassmentlegislation.aspx.
60. Tax Cuts & Jobs Act § 13307, PUB. LAW 115-97; see also I.R.C. § 162(q) (2017).
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shall be allowed under this chapter for—(1) any settlement or payment related to
sexual harassment or sexual abuse if such settlement or payment is subject to a nondisclosure agreement, or (2) attorney’s fees related to such a settlement or payment.” 61 This provision, ambiguous as it stands, might be an attempt by Congress
to gain favor with the #METOO crowd, but could have some undesired effects and
may actually negatively impact survivor-plaintiffs in a sexual harassment settlement. 62
Unfortunately, no guidance from the IRS currently exists to help understand
the applicability of this provision. Yet, Congress’s intent in adding the provision
was clearly to deter employers from adding NDAs to settlement agreements. 63
Businesses notoriously view legal settlements as a cost of doing business and costs
of doing business are generally tax deductible. 64 Therefore, the logical conclusion
is that businesses will avoid attaching NDAs to settlement agreements because they
would rather claim the deductible and face public outcry than not claim the deductible and veil the settlement. Moreover, the statute lacks a definition for “sexual
abuse” or “sexual harassment,” and also lacks clarity for what may constitute as a
“nondisclosure agreement.” 65
Even if employers are willing to hang their dirty laundry to claim a tax deduction, the provision’s ambiguity might have some unanticipated consequences: are
the plaintiff’s legal fees deductible if they agree to an NDA? The clear language of
the statute would indicate that the plaintiff would not be able to do so. Certainly, if
a plaintiff is unable to claim legal fees as a tax deduction then this would also deter
a victim from entering into an NDA, especially if they are paying an attorney on a
contingency basis. 66
In Banks v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court determined that plaintiffs have
gross income on contingent legal fees, but Congress had provided an above-the-line
deduction for employment cases several months prior to the Banks decision. 67 In
other words, generally, plaintiffs must claim 100 percent of their reward as income,
even that which they pay to the attorney, but in employment cases–at least until
now–employees can claim their rewards as a tax deduction. 68 This means that an
incentive for employees to settle cases because employers might offer less to settle
without an NDA. 69

61. Tax Cuts & Jobs Act § 13307, PUB. LAW 115-97.
62. Robert W. Wood, Tax Write-Offs in Sexual Harassment Cases After Harvey Weinstein, N.Y. ST.
B. ASS’N J. 11 (Feb. 2018), http://www.woodllp.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/Tax_WriteOffs_NYSBA.pdf.
63. Id.
64. Publication 535 (2018), Business Expenses, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/publications/p535 (last visited Mar. 25, 2019).
65. I.R.C. § 162(q) (2017); see also Paige Good, Confidential Sexual Harassment Settlement Payments No Longer Tax-Deductible, MCAFEE & TAFT (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.mcafeetaft.com/confidential-sexual-harassment-settlement-payments-no-longer-taxdeductible/ (“The [TCJA’s] failure to
define key terms in the new legislation leaves open-ended whether or how the law would apply to settlements of non-sexual-harassment disputes that nevertheless contain a release of sexual harassment
claims, or whether other claims like gender discrimination, gender retaliation, or bullying are subsumed
by the Act.”).
66. Wood, supra note 62.
67. See generally I.R.C. § 162 (2017); Commissioner v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005).
68. Commissioner, 543 U.S. at 426-39.
69. Id.
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B. The EMPOWER Act
On June 5, 2018, U.S. Senators Kamala Harris [D-CA] and Lisa Murkowski
[R-AK] introduced the EMPOWER Act (Ending the Monopoly of Power Over
Workplace harassment through Education and Reporting) into Congress in an effort
to further curb the use of NDAs in sexual harassment settlements. 70 The bill, as
introduced to Congress, contains five main objectives in combatting gaps in the law
that allow employers to privately handle sexual harassment lawsuits. 71
First, the bill seeks to make it unlawful for employers to provide NDAs and
non-disparagement clauses in contracts “as a condition of employment, promotion,
compensation, benefits, or change in employment status…[if the NDA] covers
workplace harassment, including sexual harassment…” 72 In other words, the prohibition against NDAs would cover all forms of harassment, including discriminatory, racial, religious, and not just sexual harassment. 73 Second, the bill provides for
a confidential tip-line for the reporting of workplace harassment so Fair Employment Practice Agencies could keep a record of employers where workplace harassment is “pervasive and systemic.” 74 Third, this would benefit shareholders by ending the loopholes that companies, such as Fox News, use to avoid disclosure of
harassment settlements in an effort to protect their business empire. 75 Fourth, the
Empower Act would amend the previously mentioned problems with the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act by striking subsection (q) from IRC § 162. 76 In fact, the bill goes even
further than simply removing the disastrous subsection as the bill would exclude
from gross income the amount of the judgment in a workplace harassment settlement. 77 Finally, it provides for workplace training programs and educational campaigns on how to report and prevent workplace harassment. 78
What this bill would not do is prohibit the use of NDAs in the event of a settlement so long as the settlement benefits both the employer and employee. 79 In other
words, employers could still strongarm a plaintiff-employee into signing an NDA
as long as (a) the NDA was not prearranged and a condition of employment, and
(b) the settlement was beneficial to both sides. 80 This section of the bill may just
be fluff because section 4 of the bill, which covers the prohibition of the NDAS,
clearly excludes settlements; furthermore, it may seem odd for a plaintiff-employee
to accept a settlement that is not in some arbitrary measure beneficial. 81

70. S. 2994, 115th Cong. (2018); Eleanor Salsbury, Women in Congress are Taking on Sexual Harassment with the EMPOWER Act, MS. MAGAZINE (June 14, 2018), http://msmagazine.com/blog/2018/06/14/women-congress-taking-sexual-harassment-empower-act/.
71. See The EMPOWER Act: Ending the Monopoly of Power Over Workplace Harassment Through
Education and Reporting, https://frankel.house.gov/uploadedfiles/empower_act_-_summary.pdf.
72. S. 2994, 115th Cong. (2018).
73. The EMPOWER Act, supra note 71.
74. Id. at 1.
75. Id. at 1-2.
76. Id. at 2.
77. S. 2994, 115th Cong. (2018).
78. The EMPOWER Act, supra note 71, at 3.
79. S. 2994, 115th Cong. (2018).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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C. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2018
In a February 12, 2018 letter to Congress the attorneys general of every single
U.S. State unanimously concluded that “[w]hile there may be benefits to arbitration
provisions in other contexts, they do not extend to sexual harassment claims…[Arbitrators] are not positioned to ensure that such victims are accorded both procedural and substantive due process” 82 Perhaps as a response to this letter, Senator
Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) introduced the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2018 (AFA)
on March 22. 83
The AFA identifies the original intention of the FAA to apply to “disputes between commercial entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining
power,” but that the Supreme Court extended this meaning to employment disputes
and that have run amok. 84 The AFA seeks to amend the FAA to prohibit mandatory
arbitration agreements in employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights disputes. 85 The AFA likely faces an uphill battle, even though the Democrats now
control the House. 86 Ignoring the fact that this has been languishing since March,
the bill has no bipartisan support, 87 which means that even if it did pass in the House
it likely would not pass in the Republican controlled Senate.

D. Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017
Even before Sen. Blumenthal introduced the AFA, Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (DNY), along with Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-SC), introduced the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017. 88 This bill purports to do exactly what
its overly elongated name suggests, that is end mandatory arbitration in sexual harassment cases. 89 However, as John B. Lewis points out, the broad language of this
bill may actually eliminate all forms of employment related arbitration agreements. 90
The strength of this Senate Bill is much greater than the Arbitration Fairness
Act because it has bipartisan support, which is important because this issue is
largely pushed by Democrats. 91 Therefore, if Democrats were able to attract a few
82. Sexual Harassment Claims to be Exempted from Binding Arbitration Agreements?, LOCKABY
PLLC (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.lockabylaw.com/blog/2018/02/sexual-harassment-claims-to-be-exempted-from-binding-arbitration-agreements.shtml.
83. S. 2591, 115th Cong. (2018).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Shane T. Roeber & Davis Kuelthau, Supreme Court Upholds Individual Proceedings in Arbitration Agreements -Hindering Class Actions, NAT’L L. REV. (June 19, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-upholds-individual-proceedings-arbitration-agreements-hinderingclass; Deirdre Shesgreen et al., U.S. House: Democrats Win Control, Ending Unified GOP Rule of Washington, USA TODAY (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/11/06/housemidterms-results/1830966002/.
87. S. 2591, 115th Cong. (2018).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Baker & Hostetler LLP, Another Bill Aimed at Employee Arbitration Agreements - This Time to
Nullify Epic Systems, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=94a42dfc-dd2b-44f7-b713-8800af20a7ec.
91. Tim Ryan, Democrats Fight to Curb Forced Arbitration Clauses, COURTHOUSE NEWS (Mar. 7,
2017), https://www.courthousenews.com/democrats-fight-curb-forced-arbitration-clauses/.
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Republican votes, this bill could theoretically pass the Senate and then enter the
now Democratic controlled House of Representatives. 92 Nevertheless, in a divided
Congress with little hope of amenable relations this bill may be placed on the backburners in favor of other policy concerns. 93

E. State responses
While Congress has found it difficult to get the ball rolling on METOO legislation, state legislators in nearly every state have enacted or proposed legislation to
deal with sexual harassment in the legislature, 94 and several jurisdictions have proposed restrictions on the use of NDAs in workplace harassment cases. 95

a. Washington
On March 21, 2018, Washington Governor Jay Inslee signed SB 5996, which
may have been the inspiration for at least part of the EMPOWER Act. 96 The two
are nearly identical in the prohibition of employers requiring employees to sign a
nondisclosure agreement as a condition of employment. 97 Similarly, the bill provides that there is no prohibition against confidentiality provisions in settlement
agreements between an employee and employer. 98

b. Arizona
On April 25, 2016, Arizona passed HB 2020, which prohibits public officials
from using taxpayer money to settle sexual harassment or sexual misconduct claims
as well permitting survivors who signed NDAs to break their contracts in the limited
situation of testifying at a criminal trial. 99 This bill was motivated in large part by
the previously mentioned case of McKayla Maroney, who was initially barred from
testifying at Larry Nassar’s trial. 100

92. Sarah Binder, Here are 4 Things to Expect from a New, Trumpier, More Polarized Congress,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
7,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2018/11/07/here-are-4-things-to-expect-from-a-new-trumpier-more-polarized-congress/?utm_term=.f31c3886c3dd.
93. Megan Cassella, Nancy Cook, & Gabby Orr, What Can Get Done in a Divided Washington,
POLITICO (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/06/2018-elections-house-democrats-trump-relationship-930651.
94. 2018 Legislation on Sexual Harassment in the Legislature, supra note 59.
95. Smith, supra note 16.
96. S.B. 5996, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. H.B. 2020, 53rd Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-720(B) (2018).
See also Andrew Nicla, Bill Allowing Sex Harassment Victims to Break Some Non-Disclosure Agreements Heads to Ducey, AZCENTRAL (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2018/04/12/bill-allowing-sex-assault-harassment-victims-break-non-disclosure-agreementsheads-doug-ducey/440055002/.
100. Dustin Gardiner, Arizona Lawmakers: Break Secrecy Pacts That Protect Sexual Predators
AZCENTRAL (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/2018/02/16/arizona-lawmakers-break-secrecy-pacts-protect-sexual-predators/345496002/.
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c. New York
In what is blatantly the most comprehensive legislation on sexual harassment,
New York has all but enacted Senate Bill S7848A. 101 This bill, if signed by Governor Andrew Cuomo, would prohibit NDAs in any settlement of a sexual harassment claim unless the complainant requests confidentiality. 102 This would give the
plaintiff-employee the autonomy to choose whether to share her story. 103 Additionally, the bill provides that, “except where inconsistent with federal law,” employers
shall not include mandatory arbitration clauses for claims of sexual harassment. 104

d. Maryland
Although Maryland’s “Disclosing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Act of
2018” does not explicitly place any limitations of NDAs or arbitration, the bill does
provide that “a provision in an employment, policy, or agreement that waives any
substantive or procedural right or remedy to a claim that accrues in the future of
sexual harassment…is null and void as being against the public policy of the
State.” 105 This appears to be another prohibition on arbitration clauses; however, it
is unclear why the state legislature chose to use such broad language. 106 Additionally, the bill provides that employers with 50 or more employees shall conduct and
report surveys regarding the number of sexual harassment settlements the employer
has had over the last 10 years. 107

e. Missouri
On February 22, 2018 Missouri state Representative Kevin Corlew introduced
House Bill 2552, which would amend Missouri’s Uniform Arbitration Act to render
unenforceable any arbitration clause between an employer and at-will employee
under certain conditions. 108 Those conditions are that 1) the clause must purport to
make the proceedings confidential; and 2) it must be one of the following claims:
sexual harassment, sexual assault, human trafficking, a felony or misdemeanor under RSMo 566, or any other type of discrimination against a protected class. 109 The
original bill did not include the last clause about discrimination against a protected
class and was added after passing the Special Committee on Small Business with a
vote of 8-0. 110

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

S.B. 7848A, 2018 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id. at Part B.
H.B. 1596, 2018 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018).
Id.
Id.
H.B. 2552, 2018 Reg. Session. (Mo. 2018).
Id.
Id.
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f. California
Perhaps the most important state in the wake of the #METOO movement legislation is California because many of the NDAs and mandatory arbitration agreements arise out of Hollywood. 111 On January 3, 2018, California State Senator
Connie Leyva introduced Senate Bill (SB) 820, which prohibits provisions in settlement agreements that prevent the disclosure of factual information relating to
certain claims of sexual assault, harassment, or discrimination. 112 While a survivor
could choose to keep her name private, the perpetrator’s identity cannot be confidential. 113 On September 30, 2018, Governor Jerry Brown signed SB 820 into law.
Similar to SB 820 in focus, but much larger in scope, Governor Brown also
signed SB 1300, which prohibits non-disparagement agreements as a condition for
a raise, bonus, employment, or continued employment if the agreement purports to
deny the employee the right to disclose information about unlawful acts in the workplace. 114 Moreover, the bill prohibits employers from requiring employees to sign
a release of claim or right under FEHA as a condition for a raise, bonus, employment, continued employment. 115 Notably, SB 1300 does not limit the prohibition
on non-disparagement agreements to sexual harassment, but to any unlawful act in
the workplace. 116 Nevertheless, not everyone in California was ecstatic about
Brown’s signing of SB 1300 because it allegedly makes it more difficult to quickly
resolve meritless claims short of litigation. 117
On the same day that he signed SBs 820 and 1300, Governor Brown addressed
another bill that was on his desk, Assembly Bill 3080, which was introduced on
February 16, 2018. 118 This bill sought, among other things, to prohibit mandatory
arbitration clauses in employment contracts when the claim is regarding sexual harassment or assault. 119 The bill contained language similar to Maryland’s statute by
prohibiting the waiver of “any right, forum, or procedure.” 120
Governor Brown vetoed the bill that was likely dead on arrival. 121 His veto
statement provided strong arguments for why he felt this bill would violate federal
law and why the provisions prohibiting arbitration clauses in New York and Maryland are likely unenforceable. 122 Specifically, he cited DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia
and Kindred Nursning Centers L.P. v. Clark to defeat the theory that the Federal
111. Melanie Mason, As the Legislative Year Ends, the #MeToo Movement Shows its Influence, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 3, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-legislature-harassment-response20180903-story.html.
112. S.B. 820, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
113. Id.
114. S.B. 1300, 2017-18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
115. Id.
116. Id. (“[I]ncluding, but not limited to, sexual harassment”).
117. Dan Schnur, Did Jerry Brown Make the Right Decisions on #MeToo Bills? California Leaders
are Split, SACRAMENTO BEE (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/influencers/article219579645.html (“The governor got it wrong when he signed SB 1300, a bill that will make
it harder for meritless claims to be quickly resolved short of litigation.”).
118. Assemb. B. 1300, 2017-18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Letter from Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor of California, to Members of the California State
Assembly (Sept. 30, 2018) (available at https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AB-3080veto-9.30.pdf).
122. Id.
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Arbitration Act only governs the enforcement of arbitration agreements and not the
initial formation. 123 As if anticipating the vague language provided in the Disclosing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Act of 2018 and the more comprehensive
language in SB 7848, Justice Kagan stated in her opinion in Clark that “The FAA
thus preempts any state rule discriminating on its face against arbitration–for example, a ‘law prohibit[ing] outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim.’” 124
She continued that “[the FAA] also displaces any rule that covertly accomplishes
the same objective by disfavoring contracts that (oh so coincidentally) have the defining features of arbitration agreements.” 125
In another opinion impacting arbitration, the Supreme Court of the United
States handed down the decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, which would determine that the FAA trumps the Nation Labor Relations Act, preventing employees
from collective arbitration and requiring individual arbitration. 126 However, in Epic
Systems, Justice Gorsuch seemed to invite Congress to reconsider the policy underlying its decision, 127 and in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent she wrote that “[c]ongressional correction of the Court’s elevation of the FAA… is urgently in order.” 128
On October 30, 2018, House Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY-10), along
with 58 other Democratic representatives, introduced the Restoring Justice for
Workers Act, which seeks to overturn the ruling in Epic Systems by amending the
National Labor Relations Act to prohibit any impairments to collective litigation
and by prohibiting any pre-dispute agreement that would require arbitration in employment disputes. 129 The bill would also prohibit post-dispute agreements unless
they are “truly voluntary and within the informed consent of employees.” 130 This
bill has a high likelihood of passing the Democratic controlled House and may garner some bipartisan support in the Senate because of its similarity to the bipartisan
Ending Forced Arbitration in Sexual Harassment Act. 131 Where it might lose that
bipartisanship is in the comprehensive effect in prohibiting mandatory arbitration
clauses in more than just sexual harassment cases. 132 Nonetheless, this is a problem
that Congress could theoretically resolve in a “Conference Committee,” where
members of the House and Senate meet to work out the kinks of similar but incompatible bills. 133

123. Id.; DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 468 (2015) (“The Federal Arbitration Act is a
law of the United States . . . [c]onsequently, the judges of every State must follow it.”); Kindred Nursing
Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017).
124. Kindred Nursing Ctrs., 137 S. Ct. at 1426 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.
333, 339 (2011)) (emphasis added).
125. Id.
126. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
127. Id. at 1626. “[W]hen Congress wants to mandate particular dispute resolution procedures it knows
exactly how to do so.” Id.
128. Id. at 1633.
129. H.R. 7109, 115th Cong. (2017).
130. Id.
131. S. 2591, 115th Cong. (2018).
132. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Rules That Companies Can Require Workers to Accept Individual
Arbitration, WASH. POST (May 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-rules-that-companies-can-force-workers-into-individual-arbitration/2018/05/21/09a3a9685cfa-11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f315_story.html?utm_term=.2aafaa7f9b20.
133. Glossy Term Conference Committee, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/conference_committee.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2019).
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IV. OPPOSITION TO PROHIBITIONS ON NDAS AND MANDATORY
ARBITRATION
While the culture of #METOO has led to a resounding cultural impact, not
everyone agrees that restrictions on NDAs and mandatory arbitration clauses is the
correct response. 134 In a written statement to the E.E.O.C., Kathleen McKenna, partner at Proskauer Rose LLP stated that proposals to make NDAs unlawful in sexual
harassment disputes are counterproductive. 135 She explained that while eliminating
NDAs might bring attackers to light, an unintended consequence would be that employers would be less likely to settle a dispute, thus decreasing the odds that the
plaintiff ends up recovering any damages. 136 Not all accusations that reach a settlement would satisfy the “severe or pervasive” conduct standard required under
Title VII, meaning that at least some cases that settle favorably for the plaintiff
would never make the EEOC’s threshold. 137 Further, this process would harm employers, who are typically vicariously liable for the acts of a supervisor or manager,
by shaming them for the actions of an employee that they actually condemn. 138
Moreover, McKenna condemns a prohibition on mandatory arbitration. 139
These laws would burden the already over-encumbered court system with more
sexual harassment claims because if NDAs and arbitration are both prohibited then
employers have lost incentive to bargain. 140 McKenna asserts that the embarrassment of an essentially public dispute would likely prove too much for many plaintiffs and may be a deterrent to bringing accusations. 141 Perhaps suggesting a slippery slope argument, she concludes that “one should think long and hard about elevating the protections of sexual harassment claimants above those who raise other
claims of discrimination.” 142 In other words, the next logical step might be to eliminate mandatory arbitration agreements for all kinds of discrimination. 143
There are a myriad of reasons why survivors might prefer to keep their settlement private, but most of the legislation still permits the use of NDAs as long as the
plaintiff wills it. 144 Interestingly, Robin Shea, partner at Constangy, Brooks, Smith
& Prophete LLP, suggested making NDAs in sexual harassment cases akin to those
in age discrimination claims, where the plaintiff has a safe harbor to consider a
negotiation. 145 However, her suggestion appears to miss the mark by proposing that
134. Robin Shea, In Defense of Confidentiality (Yes, Even in Harassment Cases), CONSTANGY
BROOKS, SMITH & PROPHETE LLP (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.constangy.com/employment-labor-insider/ban-confidentiality-in-sex-harassment-settlements-youll.
135. Written Testimony of Kathleen M. McKenna Proskauer Rose LLP, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/mckenna.cfm (last visited
Nov. 16, 2018).
136. Id.
137. Id.; Hafiz, supra note 23.
138. Written Testimony of Kathleen M. McKenna, supra note 135.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See S. 2994, 115th Cong. (2018) (“The provisions of subsection (a) do not apply to a nondisclosure
clause or nondisparagement clause contained in a settlement agreement or separation agreement that
resolves legal claims or disputes when . . . (B) such clauses are mutually agreed upon and mutually
benefit both the employer and the employee.”).
145. Shea, supra note 134.
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the law be changed so that a sexual harassment claimant would be entitled to a much
higher settlement with an NDA than without. 146 This seemingly innocuous result
would undermine the ability of the claimant’s autonomy by forcing her to choose
between a higher settlement or the capability of sharing her story. Former judge for
the Tenth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals Deanell Reece Tacha asserts
that alternative dispute resolution forums (i.e. arbitration) are tailor-made for sexual
harassment claims in that they contain values of confidentiality, listening, neutrality, and mutual respect. 147 Additionally, the constraints on litigation and the rules
of evidence may make arbitration a much more favorable forum for truth-seeking. 148

V. CONCLUSION
If effective change in the #METOO era comes from legislation, one likely
should not rely on Congress to resolve those issues any time soon. 149 Any change
in employment laws regarding mandatory arbitration will likely only be resolved in
state legislators, 150 or perhaps by a sneaky Senator slipping a “rider” into a new
spending bill. 151 Moreover, as Kathleen McKenna noted, in order to eliminate mandatory arbitration agreements the legislature would likely have to prohibit their use
in all discriminatory contexts. 152 The downside to such a result is that it remains
unclear if the Supreme Court will find statutes that prohibit mandatory arbitration
to be in violation of federal law. 153 While it may take an amendment to the Federal
Arbitration Act to bring about actual change in mandatory arbitration agreements,
the trend of eliminating NDAs from employment contracts and settlement negotiations in cases of sexual harassment is at least one of the outstanding results of the
movement. 154

146. Id.
147. Hon. Deanell Reece Tacha, A Case for Litigation Alternatives in #MeToo Movement, JAMS (May
23, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-case-for-litigation-alternatives-in046797/.
148. Id.
149. Catherine Rampell, States are Taking Action on #MeToo. Why isn’t Congress?, WASH. POST (Oct.
15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/states-are-taking-action-on-metoo-why-isnt-congress/2018/10/15/88b8fbf4-d0b3-11e8-83d6-291fcead2ab1_story.html?utm_term=.495bae4727aa.
150. Id.
151. Robert
Longley, What
are
Rider
Bills
in
Government?,
THOUGHTCO.,
https://www.thoughtco.com/rider-bills-in-the-us-congress-stealth-legislation-4090449 (last updated
Apr. 3, 2018).
152. Written Testimony of Kathleen M. McKenna, supra note 135.
153. David S. Baffa, Noah A. Finkel & Joseph S. Turner, United States: Halloween Bill Provides A
Scare by Seeking to Prohibit Workplace Arbitration Altogether, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/752646/ (last updated Nov. 8, 2018).
154. Jessica Bennett, After #MeToo, The Ripple Effect, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/arts/what-is-next-metoo-movement.html.
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